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INTRODUCTION 
Many of the luxuries of modern life would not exist but for explosive growth and 
innovation in chemical development over the last two centuries.
1
 Advances in chemistry 
modernized medicine, increased crop yields, slowed the spoliation of food, and facilitated low 
cost manufacturing using new polymer compounds.
2
 And according to the American Chemistry 
Council (ACC), in 2013 American chemical production produced 19% of the world’s total 
output, making it a $689 billion industry that directly impacts over 96% of manufactured goods 
across the globe.
3
  
However, even beneficial chemical substances and products containing them may pose 
public health risks. The Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), first enacted in 1976, was 
intended to facilitate the sharing of information about these substances and the promulgation of 
comprehensive safety regulations.
4
 However, regulating existing chemicals under TSCA proved 
unworkable after 1991,
5
 and states stepped in to fill the regulatory void.
6 
The patchwork of state 
regulations that arose and evolving regulations in Europe
7
 and Asia
8
 mean that manufacturers are 
                                                          
1
 Lynn L. Bergeson, Hope Is Restored In Finally Modernizing TSCA, LAW360, June 19, 2013, 
https://www.law360.com/articles/449338/hope-is-restored-in-finally-modernizing-tsca; Five Chemistry Inventions 
That Enabled the Modern World, THE CONVERSATION, June 1, 2015, https://theconversation.com/five-chemistry-
inventions-that-enabled-the-modern-world-42452 
2
 Five Chemistry, supra note 1. 
3
 Bergeson, supra note 1. 
4
 Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat 2003 § 2 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 2601(a)) 
(2012). 
5
 Not a single existing substance has been regulated under § 6 of TSCA since the 1991 Corrosion Proof Fittings 
case, and under the preexisting TSCA, “the EPA ha[d] tested only 200 chemicals and regulated five.” Andy Szal, 
EPA Official Takes Issue With Chemical Reform Bill, MANUFACTURING.NET, April 16, 2015, 
https://www.manufacturing.net/news/2015/04/epa-official-takes-issue-chemical-reform-
bill?__hstc=17104102.197963abe1f120924294a1530410a59d.1493654791648.1493752901913.1493756433621.3&
__hssc=17104102.9.1493756433621&__hsfp=20068296  (last visited May 5, 2017). 
6
 See NCSL Policy Update: State Statutes on Chemical Safety. http://www.ncsl.org/research/environment-and-
natural-resources/ncsl-policy-update-state-statutes-on-chemical-safety.aspx (last visited May 5, 2017). 
7
 See, e.g., Isabelle Laborde, Reach: The New European Union Chemicals Regulations, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, 
WINTER 2009, at 63-65 (outlining the EU’s REACH initiative); European Chemicals Agency, Understanding 
REACH, https://echa.europa.eu/regulations/reach/understanding-reach (last visited May 3, 2017). 
3 
 
operating in an increasingly diverse regulatory environment. Additionally, major retailers have 
begun pulling products containing toxic ingredients, such as endocrine disruptors, in response to 
consumer advocacy.
9
 Changes domestically and abroad led the chemical industry to conclude 
that it was time to push for modernization of America’s chemical laws.10 This is the background 
upon which the bipartisan and multi-faceted TSCA reform coalition was conceived. 
Reforming TSCA has been a long time coming, 
 
and its achievement in 2016 is one of the 
most significant developments in environmental laws since the Clean Air Act amendments in 
1994. The Frank Lautenberg Chemical Safety for the 21st Century Act (FL21) was the product 
of years of lobbying, research, and painstaking negotiations.
11
 There are several overarching 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
8
 Regulations and Chemical Lists Continue to Appear in Asia, CHEMICAL WATCH October 2013 
https://chemicalwatch.com/16953/regulations-and-chemical-lists-continue-to-appear-in-asia 
[https://perma.cc/QNU2-P7GL] (discussing the rise of regulations and banned or restricted chemical lists in Asian 
countries). 
9
 See, e.g, Jan Lee, CVS Banishes Formaldehyde, Other Toxics From Cosmetics, TRIPLEPUNDIT, April 24, 2017, 
http://www.triplepundit.com/2017/04/cvs-will-ban-formaldehyde-toxic-substances-cosmetics-2019/ (reporting on 
the decision of CVS to pull cosmetic products containing certain endocrine disruptors); Andy Szal, Target Aims to 
Remove ‘Unwanted Chemicals’ From Its Products, CHEMINFO, January 4, 2017, 
http://www.chem.info/news/2017/01/target-aims-remove-unwanted-chemicals-its-
products?cmpid=horizontalcontent (Discussing Target’s decision to identify and eliminate “unwanted chemicals” 
from its product inventory); Andy Szal, Report Praises Walmart, But Blasts Home Depot, Walgreens, and Others 
For Chemical Policies, CHEMINFO, Nov. 18, 2016, http://www.chem.info/news/2016/11/report-praises-walmart-
blasts-home-depot-walgreens-and-others-chemical-policies?cmpid=verticalcontent [https://perma.cc/2YQ2-YBMN] 
(discussing a report by “Safer Chemicals Healthy Families” that graded eleven large retail companies on whether 
they carry products with toxic ingredients and the companies’ transparency regarding such information);  Wendy 
Kock, Ten Retailers Urged to Pull Potentially Toxic Products, USATODAY, April 9, 2013, 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/04/09/retailers-products-toxic-chemicals/2067113/ 
[https://perma.cc/ED7Q-SR95] (Discussing campaign to have products containing hazardous ingredients pulled 
from shelves); Marc Gunther, Under Pressure: Campaigns That Persuaded Companies to Change the World, Feb. 
9, 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/2015/feb/09/corporate-ngo-campaign-environment-
climate-change (discussing how consumer and NGO activism is impacting the business world); Katie Thomas, The 
‘No More Tears’ Shampoo, Now With No Formaldehyde, NY TIMES, Jan. 17, 2014, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/18/business/johnson-johnson-takes-first-step-in-removal-of-questionable-
chemicals-from-products.html [https://perma.cc/U2HG-4DME ]; Dirty Dozen Endocrine Disruptors, 
ENVIRONMENTAL WORKING GROUP, Oct. 28, 2013, http://www.ewg.org/research/dirty-dozen-list-endocrine-
disruptors (Listing twelve endocrine disrupters contained in household products and encouraging consumers to 
avoid purchasing products containing such substances). 
10
 Richard A. Denison, A Primer on The New Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) and What Led To It (hereinafter 
“Primer”), p 4, April 2017, https://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/denison-primer-on-lautenberg-act.pdf 
11
 Frank R. Lautenberg Chemical Safety for the 21st Century Act, Pub L. No. 114-182, 130 Stat. 448 (June 22, 
2016) (codified at 15 U.S.C. 2601 et seq.); Barack Obama, President of the United States, Remarks by the President 
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goals of the FL21. The first is to make it easier to regulate toxic substances. This involved 
bringing the pre-market review of § 5 closer to the “No Data, No Market” principle of the 
European Union’s (“EU”) REACH initiative.12 Also, for existing chemicals, the “least 
burdensome” language was removed from § 6 of TSCA and the threshold for risk management is 
now a pure health-based standard.
13
 Second, the public availability access to chemical safety data 
will be increased.
14 
But perhaps the most important goal is to foster the development of a 
national, uniform system of chemical safety regulation. Such a system will eventually replace 
much of the patchwork of state laws through the preemption.
15
 This Article focuses on the final 
goal. It analyzes why preemption was so important to reform, explains how preemption functions 
under the new law, and highlights uncertainties that should be considered moving forward. 
Under the new law, upon request from the industry
16
 or on its own initiative,
17
 the EPA 
must perform risk evaluations on high-priority substances—those that are thought likely to pose 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
at Bill Signing of the Frank R. Lautenberg Chemical Safety for the 21st Century Act (June 22, 2016) 
[https://perma.cc/4J57-V8U3]. 
12
 See Noah M. Sachs, Jumping the Pond: Transnational Law and the Future of Chemical Regulation, 62 VAND. L. 
REV. 1817, 1833-35 (2009). The similarities between the amended TSCA and the EU REACH program are easily 
seen if one reviews prior scholarly work:  
Like [the pre-amended] TSCA, EU chemical legislation prior to REACH focused on testing of 
“new” chemicals (those introduced after 1981 in Europe), exempted most existing chemicals from 
testing, and placed the burden of proof on EU Member States to prove that chemicals were unsafe. 
The older European legislation led to the same informational logjams and data gaps that the 
United States has experienced under TSCA. Of the 30,000 existing chemicals with annual 
production volumes in Europe of over one ton, only 140 had been identified as priorities 
for testing under the prior legislation, and full risk assessments had been prepared for only about 
seventy of these chemicals. Chemicals introduced since 1981 had been subject to rigorous toxicity 
testing in Europe, but they represented less than 1 percent of all the chemicals marketed in Europe. 
Id. at 1833-34. 
13
 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 2605(a) (2017). 
14
 These changes are encompassed in the loosing of confidential business information (CBI) protections, the 
granting to the EPA the authority to demand additional testing if believed necessary, and giving local governments, 
first responders, and health care professionals access to important information. See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 2603, 2613 
(2017). 
15
 15 U.S.C.A § 2617 (2017).  
16
 See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 2605(b)(4)(C)(ii), (4)(E) (2017). 
17
 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 2605(b)(4)(C)(i) (2017). 
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an unreasonable health and safety risk to the public.
18
 After the evaluation is complete, the 
regulations promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) will preempt state 
regulations that fall within the scope of the EPA’s pre-regulation review.19 As such, the federal 
standard has the potential to set the regulatory floor and the ceiling for many toxic substances. 
Narrow exceptions do exists if states can convince the EPA to grant a discretionary waiver,
20
 and 
state laws requiring labeling or public disclosure of information will largely remain in place.
21
 
Expanding federal preemption was essential to the passage of FL21. While the regulatory 
schemes of California and Massachusetts were exempted from preemption, other states will be 
subject to the limitations of federal preemption.
22
 This was, however, not an easily won or 
costless concession from the states. Even among the coalition that supported reform there was 
much debate about expanding preemption and many states and environmental groups opposed 
those provisions.
23
  
If the EPA implements strong safety regulations, then the sacrifice of state regulatory 
autonomy may be a fair price to pay for a uniform national scheme. After all, while state level 
chemical regulations are growing in numbers, they are diverse in their structure, rigor, and 
protectiveness.
24
 As it stands, a citizen’s protection from exposure to toxic chemicals depends 
largely on where they reside.
25
 But, the is a concern that federal regulations will not be protective 
as the state laws they replace, thus “weaker” laws will replace “stronger” ones, or that the EPA 
                                                          
18
 See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 2605(b)(1)(A)-(B) (2017). 
19
 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 2617(b)(C)(2) (2017). 
20
 See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 2617(d), (e), (f). 
21
 15 U.S.C.A § 2617(a) (2017). 
22
 Accord 15 U.S.C.A §§ 2617(a), (b), (d)(2) (2017). 
23
 See infra Part II. 
24
 See National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL), Toxic Substances Control Act Reform (May 19, 2014), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/environment-and-natural-resources/state-chemical-statutes.aspx.  
25
 Id. 
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will fail to implement the new law in a timely manner.
26
 Additionally, separate legislation 
making its way through congress would impose a rigorous cost-benefit assessment, designed to 
push for regulations with a lower net cost, which could hamper implementation of health based 
restrictions under the new TSCA.
27
  
There are, however, reasons to believe that the TSCA amendments will result in a net 
benefit in public health and safety for the American public. The statute itself preserves several 
alternative legal channels through which states can monitor or limit chemical production and use, 
short of direct regulation.
28
 Also, preemption, while widely applicable, only affects a fairly 
narrow subset of the most hazardous chemicals.
29
 The chemical industry also has invested a great 
deal of time and money into TSCA reform.
30
 In light of the continued ability of consumers to 
lobby retailers to remove products that are not perceived as adequately regulated, the industry 
has an economic motive to work with its new found allies to push for strong science-based 
regulations.
31
  
The forthcoming discussion will proceed in four Parts. First, Part I briefly discusses the 
old law and the rise of regulations among the states and internationally.
32
 Part II analyzes the 
                                                          
26
 Some have pointed out that agencies have notoriously bad track records at meeting deadlines, Scott Atherley, 
Federal Agency Compliance With Congressional Regulatory Deadlines, R STREET POLICY STUDY NO. 39, Aug. 
2015, http://www.rstreet.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/RSTREET39.pdf. [https://perma.cc/9ZX6-GKAK]. But 
the importance of the deadlines in TSCA is that they are explicitly judicially enforceable under the statute, thus if 
the agencies misses a deadline, a cause of action to compel action automatically ripens. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C.A §§ 
2603(a)(2)(B), 2604(a)(4), 2605(b)(2), (4), 2605(c) (2017). 
27
 Richard Denison, Congress Just Fixed TSCA – Yet is Now Gearing Up to Re-Impose the Worst Flaws of the Old 
Law Across the Entire Federal Government, ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, March 8, 2017, 
http://blogs.edf.org/health/2017/03/08/congress-just-fixed-tsca-yet-is-now-gearing-up-to-re-impose-the-worst-flaws-
of-the-old-law-across-the-entire-federal-government/. (Discussing the proposed Regulatory Accountability Act, 
H.R. 5, 115
th
 Cong. (2017)). 
28
 See infra Part III and Section IV.A. 
29
 Id. 
30
 See infra Section IV.B. 
31
 Id. 
32
 Infra Part I 
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concerns that led preemption to become one of the most important topics in the reform debate.
33
 
Next, Part III presents some of the most significant changes to TSCA as well as the EPA’s 
proposed rule for the risk evaluation process.
34
 Finally, Part IV argues several points.
35
 First 
TSCA leaves states substantial room to continue regulating chemical substances directly and 
indirectly.
36
 Second, while the law gives an avenue for increased control over the regulatory 
agenda, there are many factors that make it unclear how much this power will be exercised.
37
 
Additionally, this Part discusses the economic motivations that may encourage the industry be 
less resistant to strong regulations and some of the uncertainties that remain moving forward.
38
  
I. THE DRIVE FOR TSCA REFORM THAT MADE PREEMPTION KEY  
 The push for TSCA’s original enactment traces to the Council of Environmental Quality 
(CEQ)
39
 and an early CEQ report.
40
 With this report in mind, and with the intention of 
implementation along-side other environmental legislation, such as the Clean Water Act
41
 and 
the Clean Air Act,
42
 the purpose of TSCA was to “prevent unreasonable risks of injury to health 
or the environment associated with the manufacture, processing, distribution in commerce, use, 
or disposal of chemical substances.”43 When enacted, many believed TSCA would be the 
                                                          
33
 Infra Part II 
34
 Infra Part III. 
35
 Infra Part IV 
36
 Infra Section IV.A. 
37
Infra Section IV.B 
38
 Infra Sections IV.C-.D. 
39
 David Markell, New Directions in Environmental Law: An Overview of TSCA, its History and Key Underlying 
Assumptions, and its Place in Environmental Regulation, 32 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 333, 338-39 (2010) (discussing 
the four key conclusions of the CEQ report that formed the foundation for drafting TSCA). Markell, supra note 39, 
at 338-39 (citing U.S. Council on Environmental Quality, Toxic Substances 759-60 (Apr. 1971), reprinted in 
Environmental and Natural Resources Policy Division, Legislative History of the Toxic Substances Control Act 757 
(1976)). 
40
See Markell, supra, note 39, at 338-39 (discussing the findings of the Toxic Substances report). 
41
 Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. §1251 et seq. (1972). 
42
 Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. §7401 et seq. (1970). 
43
 S. Rep. No. 94-698, at 1 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4491, 4491. For a more in-depth review of TSCA 
prior to its amendment and its place within environmental law see generally Markell, supra note 39 (reviewing the 
actions that led to TSCA and the hurdles it has faced since enactment). 
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mechanism through which the hazards accompanying chemical production and use would be 
monitored, documented, and controlled. Time and litigation have demonstrated that TSCA did 
not result in a comprehensive system of national chemical safety laws.
44
 
For much of its existence TSCA has been essentially a dead law.
45
 “In fact, . . . EPA has 
issued regulations under the act to ban or limit or restrict the production or use of only five 
existing chemicals,” since TSCA was enacted.46 Thousands of existing substances have never 
being reviewed despite widespread use.
47
 And the EPA has only taken twenty-five actions (25) 
regarding “new chemicals” or “significant new uses” under the old law, only some of which 
actually restricted toxic substances in any way.
48
 Thus, while international chemical regulations 
have grown, companies in the United States have largely been able to produce and distribute 
many chemical substances without sharing information with the EPA or the American public.
49
 
                                                          
44
 A Practitioner's Guide to the Toxic Substances Control Act: Part III, 24 ELR 10357, 10359-60 (hereinafter 
“Practitioner’s Guide III) (discussing the EPA’s failed attempt to ban asbestos under § 6 of TSCA). For the full text 
of the Corrosion Proof case and further discussion see the following resources: Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 
947 F.2d 1201, 1216-17 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that § 6 of the Toxic Substance Control Act required the EPA to 
evaluate the costs and benefits of all permissible regulatory regimes for asbestos and choose the least burdensome 
option that would accomplish the desired result). The former rule is contained at Asbestos; Manufacturing, 
Importation, Processing, and Distribution in Commerce Prohibitions, 54 Fed. Reg. 29460 (1989). See also Chris 
Hastings, TSCA Reform and the Need to Preserve State Chemical Safety Laws, 30 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. LAW 307, 
308 (2015). 
45
 Mark A. Greenwood, TSCA Reform: Building a Program That Can Work, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. 10034, 10034 (2009) 
(“In the early 1990s, when the courts rejected EPA's comprehensive ban on asbestos, TSCA became widely known 
as a "broken" statute.”). 
46
 Markell, supra note 39, at 368-69. Lynn Bergeson, In-House Counsel Beware: TSCA Reform Impacts Everyone, 
LAW360, June 15, 2016, http://www.actagroup.com/uploads/docs/In- 
House_Counsel_Beware_TSCA_Reform_Impacts_Everyone.pdf. However, the EPA did restrict four “new 
chemicals” under § 5(f). 
47
 See Sachs, supra note 12, at 1831. Sachs notes that despite TSCA’s existence, we still are largely ignorant about 
the risks that we are exposed to. “Some chemicals that have gone untested for decades may be completely harmless; 
others may be unidentified agents of endocrine disruption, birth defects, cancer, or neurological damage. The crucial 
point is that the United States lacks a sophisticated system for obtaining the risk data that would allow regulators, 
firms, and consumers to distinguish harmful (or potentially harmful) chemicals from harmless ones.” Id.  
48
 To view these EPA actions I utilized the EPA’S CHEMVIEW database and the following search path. 
https://java.epa.gov/chemview#dashboard (Click advanced search, select text search, enter “section 5” in the text 
box, click the box for “exact wording of phrase,” under output options select “EPA Actions,” click “Generate 
Results”). Last visited May 1, 2017. 
49
 Sachs, supra note 12, at 1831. This is not to say that other laws have not imposed substantial requirements on the 
industry. 
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States eventually began efforts to fill this void with the assistance of various NGOs.
50
 The 
failures of TSCA have been well documented and need not be repeated here,
51
 rather this Article 
will focus on what led to reform and the trade-offs made to facilitate passage of the amendments. 
As a part of this discussion, a few provision of the old law will be summarize, as will the 
landscape of state and international regulations.  
A. TSCA’s Major Provisions and Flaws 
 Because preemption became such an important issue in the debate leading to the FL21 
amendments, it may come as a surprise that the new law merely expanded on existing 
preemption provisions.
52
 A general understanding of three sections of the old law are key to 
understanding why preemption was such an important issue. First, are §§ 5 and 6, which 
provided the EPA authority to regulate new and existing chemicals.
53
 Next is § 18, which 
contained the old preemption standards.
54
  
1. Sections 5 and 6: Regulation of New and Existing Chemicals 
 Section 5 and 6 of TSCA provided the EPA authority to regulate chemicals. Under § 5 
manufacturers had to submit notice and test data to the EPA for all new chemicals or significant 
new uses of chemicals prior to beginning production.
55
 On the basis of that information, the EPA 
could then regulate or prohibit the production of the new chemical, but only if the agency 
                                                          
50
 Richard A. Denison, Policy Options for Generating Information for Sound Chemical Management, in OPTIONS OF 
STATE CHEMICALS POLICY REFORM: A RESOURCE GUIDE, Univ. of Mass. Lowell Center for Sustainable Prod. 35-69 
(2008) available at http://www.chemicalspolicy.org/downloads/OptionsforStateChemicalsPolicyReform.pdf. 
51
 See, e.g., Markell, supra, note 39, at 360-69 (discussing the history and motivation of TSCA); Greenwood, supra, 
note 45at 10035-41 (discussing various flaws in TSCA and areas that new regulation can help); Hastings, supra, 
note 44at 307-310 (discussing the history of TSCA, preemption, and the push for reform). 
52
 See 15 U.S.C. 2617 (2012). 
53
 Subsection II.A.1. 
54
 Subsection II.A.2. 
55
 Toxic Substance Control Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2604(a), (b) (2012). 
10 
 
determined that the production or use of the substance presented “an unreasonable risk of injury 
to health or the environment.”56  
Additionally, § 6 granted the EPA authority to regulate the over 60,000 existing 
chemicals at the time of TSCA’s enactment.57 This section allowed the EPA to regulate, or even 
ban, the production, use, or distribution of such substance, but only those that the agency 
determined, “presents or will present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the 
environment.”58 However, because regulations under § 6 were required to be the “least 
burdensome” necessary to combat the identified risks, which the Fifth Circuit interpreted as 
requiring a series of independent cost assessments, it became all but impossible to enact 
comprehensive restrictions.
59
  
  2. Section 18: Preemption and Waiver 
 It is somewhat surprising that preemption became the key issue surrounding the passage 
of the FL21 amendments; because, TSCA regulations have always triggered preemption.
60
 The 
                                                          
56
 Id. at 2604(e). 
57
 Toxic Substance Control Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (2012); A Practitioner's Guide to the Toxic 
Substances Control Act: Part III, 24 ELR 10357, 10358-59 (hereinafter “Practitioner’s Guide III”). 
58
 15 U.S.C § 2605(a) (2012). See also Practitioner’s Guide III, supra note ___, at 10358-59. 
59
 Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1216-17 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that § 6 of the Toxic Substance 
Control Act required the EPA to evaluate the costs and benefits of all permissible regulatory regimes for asbestos 
and choose the least burdensome option that would accomplish the desired result). Prior to FL21,TSCA required 
that the agency thoroughly address each of the following in a published statement: 
(A) the effects of such substance or mixture on health and the magnitude of the exposure of human 
beings to such substance or mixture; 
(B) the effects of such substance or mixture on the environment and the magnitude of the exposure 
of the environment to such substance or mixture; 
(C) the benefits of such substance or mixture for various uses and the availability of substitutes for 
such uses; and 
(D) the reasonably ascertainable economic consequences of the rule, after consideration of the 
effect on the national economy, small business, technological innovation, the environment, and 
public health.  
15 U.S.C. § 2605(c)(1)(A)-(D) (2012). 
60
 15 U.S.C.§ 2617 (2012); Hasting, supra, note 51at 311-14; Toxic Substances Control Act Reform: What’s 
Happening and What’s Next (Dialogue, statements of Lawrence Culleen), 46 ELR 10357, 10358 (5-2016).  
11 
 
old preemption provisions were modest and about a page long.
61
 Following the promulgation of 
a § 5 or § 6 action, TSCA prohibited the enactment or enforcement of any law regarding a 
chemical that targets the same risks or uses as the federal rule, unless it is (1) identical to the 
federal requirement, (2) adopted pursuant to other federal authority, or (3) completely bans the 
use of the substance in the state or political subdivision.
62
 The former § 18 also had exemption 
provisions, which are similar in spirit to the new waiver provisions.
63
 A state was permitted to 
seek a discretionary exemption from the preemptive effect of TSCA if it met the statutory 
criteria.
64
  
Prior to 2016 preemption, while legally possible, remained unused. As an illustration of 
this point, in a discussion concerning legislative proposals leading to FL21, one commentator 
noted that he was unaware of “any trace of anybody talking about [preemption] for the preceding 
30 years of TSCA’s existence, but it has become a central issue.”65 This is likely because the 
                                                          
61
 See Pub. Law 94-469, 90 Stat 2003, 2038-39 (Oct. 11, 1976) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §2617 (2012)). Section 18 
also prohibited a state, or political subdivision of the same, from enacting or enforcing a testing requirement for 
purposes that are similar to those of a rule enacted under § 4. 15 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(2)(A).  
62
 15 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(2)(B) (emphasis added)(“if the Administrator prescribes a rule or order under section 5 or 6 . 
. . no State or political subdivision of a State may, after the effective date of such requirement, establish or continue 
in effect, any requirement which is applicable to such substance or mixture, or an article containing such substance 
or mixture, and which is designed to protect against such risk . . .”). 
63
 See 15 U.S.C. § 2617(b) (2012). 
64
 Id. The exact language is that the state may be granted an exemption from having its regulation preempted if: 
compliance with the requirement would not cause the manufacturing, processing, distribution in 
commerce, or use of the substance, mixture, or article to be in violation of the applicable 
requirement under this Act described in subsection (a) (2), and (2) the State or political 
subdivision requirement (A) provides a significantly higher degree of protection from such risk 
than the requirement under this Act described in subsection (a) (2) and (B) does not, through 
difficulties in marketing, distribution, or other factors, unduly burden interstate commerce. 
§ 2617(b)(1) (2012). 
65
 Toxic Substances Control Act Reform: What’s Happening and What’s Next (Dialogue, statements of Lawrence 
Culleen), 46 ELR 10357, 10358 (5-2016). This comment was made by Lawrence E Culleen, a partner at Arnold & 
Porter, LLP and seasoned practitioner in the realm of chemical compliance, during a discussion about proposed 
TSCA reform in May 2016.  
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downstream impacts of the Fifth Circuit’s ruling in Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA66 prevented 
courts or states from having to grapple with the concern of § 6 regulations triggering preemption. 
B. The Rise of Chemical Regulations Among the States and Abroad 
The lack of comprehensive federal regulation for many toxic chemicals should not be 
taken as a signal that the American public does not care about chemical safety. In fact, many 
states have been active in passing labeling, disclosure, and use restrictions within their own 
boarders.
67
As of January 1, 2017, thirty-eight states had enacted at least one statute that regulated 
the manufacture, distribution, labeling, or use of chemicals and the products containing specific 
substances.
68
 Of those states, thirteen regulate the use of flame retardants in consumer products 
and twelve (plus the District of Columbia) restrictions for the use of bisphenol A (BPA).
69
 In a 
related manner, the market itself became increasingly hostile to chemical manufacturers as 
companies like Walmart and Home Depot began pulling products containing certain substances 
in reaction to consumer advocacy.
70
   
California, for example, has a comprehensive law commonly known as Proposition 65, 
which was enacted in 1986. The law requires the state to publish a list of chemicals that are 
known to cause cancer or reproductive toxicity.
71
 Under Prop 65, a business that creates 
                                                          
66
 See Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1216-17 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that § 6 of the Toxic 
Substance Control Act required the EPA to evaluate the costs and benefits of all permissible regulatory regimes for 
asbestos and choose the least burdensome option that would accomplish the desired result). 
67
 See NCSL, supra, note 24 (listing states with chemical safety laws); Hasting, supra, note 44, at 314-319. 
68
 See NCSL, supra, note 24 (listing states with chemical safety laws). 
69
 See NCSL, supra, note 24.. Many flame retardants have been associated with “liver toxicity, thyroid toxicity, and 
neurodevelopmental toxicity in humans.” Id. These substances are commonly used in furniture, building materials, 
paints, and other consumer products. Bisphenol A (BPA) is a hardening agent in plastics that has been linked to 
“accelerated puberty and an increased risk for cancer, heart disease and diabetes.” Id. 
70
 See supra, note 9and the sources cited therein. 
71
 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY §§ 25252, 25252.5, 25253, 25254, 25255, 25257 (2008); Cal. Health & Safety Code §§ 
108100-108515 (2008). For history, documents, and controversies see David Roe, A Quick Reference Guide to 
California's Proposition 65, Prop. 65 Kit, at http://www.prop65kit.org (last visited June 21, 2002). See also, David 
Roe, Ready or Not: The Coming Wave of Toxic Chemicals, 29 ECOLOGY L.Q. 623, 631 (2002) (Mr. Roe was the 
primary author of the Proposition 65 ballot measure). 
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exposure to a listed chemical is required to issue warnings to their customers, consumers or 
buyers of a product, or members of the public so exposed.
72
 While not required, the regulatory 
agencies often produce risk-based calculations, which states what level of exposure will make 
the product ineligible for an exemption.
73
 In practice, the risk-based calculations have become de 
facto risk-based standards, incentivizing cooperation with the regulators to ensure smooth and 
unobstructed access to the market.
74
 California’s Prop 65, as well as the Massachusetts Toxics 
Use Reduction Act
75
 were grandfathered in under the TSCA amendments and are not subject to 
preemption.
76
 Preservation of these two laws was an essential concession in the negotiations 
leading to TSCA reform, much as preservation of California’s emissions standards were essential 
to the 1994 CAA amendments.
77
  
The state of New York, on the other hand, also has a host of chemical regulations that 
could be subject to preemption. For example, the TRIS-Free Children and Babies Act,
78
 which 
bans the use of the flame retardant tris(2-chloroethyl) phosphate (TRIS) in products intended for 
use by children under the age of 3 years, could be subject to preemption if those chemicals are 
evaluated under § 6. New York’s attorney general, Eric T. Schneiderman, was a vocal opponent 
of the expanding TSCA’s preemptive powers.79  
                                                          
72
 Roe, supra, note 71 at 631. 
73
 Id. 
74
 Id. at 632. 
75
 Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 94B, §§ 1-10 (2008). 
76
 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 2617(a), (b), (d)(2) (2017). 
77
  See, e.g., Taly L. Jolish, Negotiating the Smog Away, 18 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 305, 311-12 (1999) (Discussing the 
exemption of the California emission standards from preemption). See also, CAA § 209(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b) 
(2012). When the CAA amendments passed, California was the only state that had adopted emission standards 
before March 30, 1966. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. New York State Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation, 17 F.3d 521, 525 
(2d Cir.1994). California received the exception because one of the state's senators convinced the Senate Committee 
on Public Works that California's “unique problems and pioneering efforts warranted a waiver from preemption.” Id. 
78
 N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 37-0701-37-0709 (2011). 
79
 Pat Rizzuto, States Can Regulate Chemicals Under TSCA Reform Bill, BLOOMBERG BNA (June 14, 2016). 
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States also have been active in restricting the use of lead, BPA, and other substances in 
children’s products,80 as well as regulating caustic and corrosive chemicals.81 Many states, 
through the National Council of State Legislatures (NCSL) opposed earlier proposed TSCA 
legislation precisely because the preemption language was so strong.
82
 Moreover, while NCSL 
supported TSCA reform as a concept, it submitted a joint letter with the Environmental Council 
of States (ECOS) to U.S. Senate leadership urging them to avoid having FL21 preempt state 
chemical laws and to loosen the requirements for obtaining preemption waivers.
83
 However, 
despite the concerns voiced by some states about the preemption language, none are prepared to 
challenge the TSCA reforms at this time.
84
 
II. PREEMPTION’S MOVEMENT TO THE CENTER OF THE REFORM DEBATE AND THE CONCERNS 
RAISED BY STAKEHOLDERS 
That TSCA needed improvement has long been an accepted reality, but the path to 
reform was long and difficult. In 2011, the chemical industry joined the push for reform.
85
  In 
2013, Senator Lautenberg, a longtime advocate for TSCA reform, began to work across the aisle 
with Senator Vitter, whose home state, Louisiana, includes some of the nation’s largest 
petroleum manufacturers.
86
 The fruit of their efforts is a bipartisan piece of legislation supported 
                                                          
80
 Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 21a-335 through 21a-376 (2016); Ga. Code Ann. § 31-41-10 et seq.; Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 
38, §§ 1691-1699-B (2008); Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 94B, §§ 1-10 (2008); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 701.300 (2016) et seq.; 
N.Y. Public Health Law § 1370 (McKinney 2016) et seq.; Okla. Stat. tit. 63, § 1-114.1; Children's Safe Products Act 
70 R.C.W. 280; Relating to the Use of Bisphenol A 70 R.C.W. 240.010-.060. 
81
 Ala. Code § 8-17-20 (2016) et seq.; Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 36-1101 (2016) et seq.; Del. Code. Ann. tit. 16 § 2301 
(2016) et seq. 
82
 NCSL, supra note 6. See also NCSL Letter to the House Environment and the Economy Subcommittee regarding 
the Chemicals in Commerce Act (May 19, 2014) available at 
http://www.ncsl.org/documents/standcomm/scnri/NewDraftCICA_Letter.pdf, [https://perma.cc/5TRG-EB64]; 
83
 Joint NCSL & ECOS Letter to U.S. Senate Leadership Regarding FL21 (Sept. 23, 2015) available at 
http://www.ncsl.org/documents/standcomm/scnri/NCSL_ECOS_S697.pdf, [https://perma.cc/P4DU-Q2WC]. 
84
 Id. California, New York, and some southern states will likely be the primary parties of interest. 
85
 See Bergeson, supra note 1; Anthony Adragna, The Inside Story of Congress’ Battle for Chemical Reform, June 
23, 2016, https://www.bna.com/inside-story-congress-n57982074649/. 
86
 See Bergeson, supra note 1. 
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industry and environmental groups alike.
87
 However, expanding preemption was hotly 
contested.
88
 
Several earlier efforts at TSCA reform, such as the Chemicals in Commerce Act (CICA) 
failed to gain traction. These were opposed by organizations like the National Conference of 
State Legislature (NCSL) largely because of the broad preemptive language.
89
 Testifying on 
behalf of NCSL, state Senator Michael Moore of Massachusetts argued this earlier bill contained 
“onerous preemption language that would handcuff states from acting against harmful chemicals 
to protect their population. It was said, CICA ignored nearly 40 years of state policy in an 
attempt to provide a one-size-fits-all approach to toxic chemicals regulation.”90 He also took 
issue with the fact that CICA did not preserve state regulatory authority concerning air and water 
quality standards.
91
 
Similarly, even the early democratic reform proposals, like the Safe Chemicals Act of 
2013, were opposed by representatives from states that already had comprehensive chemical 
laws, like California and Massachusetts, because the preemption language was viewed as overly 
broad.
92
 Safer Chemicals, Healthy Families (SCHF) went so far as to call the legislation “phony 
                                                          
87
 Frank R. Lautenberg Chemical Safety for the 21st Century Act, Pub L. No. 114-182, 130 Stat. 448 (June 22, 
2016) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. 2601 et seq.). See also Denison, supra, note 67; 162 Cong Rec S3513, S3514 
(daily ed. June 7, 2016) (statement of Sen. Markey) (Noting that FL21 received more votes in the House of 
Representatives—403 total—than the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, or the Safe Drinking Water Act when 
they were reauthorized). Unfortunately, Senator Lautenberg did not live to see his crowning achievement become 
law. 
88
 See, e.g., Hasting, supra note 44, at 321-25. 
89
 NCSL, supra note 6. See also supra notes 82& 83 and the NCSL letters cited therein. 
90
 Testimony of Senator Michael Moore of the Massachusetts State Senate Before the U.S. House Comm. on Energy 
and Commerce Subcommittee on Envt’l and the Econ, 114th Cong., p. 2 (April 29, 2014), available at 
http://www.ncsl.org/documents/standcomm/scnri/moore_cica_testimony.pdf, [https://perma.cc/VQB9-DPPY]. 
91
 Id. p 3. 
92
 Frederic J. Frommer, Chemical Bill Faces Uphill Senate Battle, CHEMINFO, Sept.9, 2015, 
http://www.chem.info/news/2014/09/chemical-reform-bill-faces-uphill-senate-battle (republished from the 
Associated Press). 
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reform.”93 But without support from the industry, the early Democrat sponsored bills failed.94 
Luckily, by 2013, industry advocacy groups were committed to achieving TSCA reform that 
could be supported by both sides while making safety a top priority.
95
 But preemption was still 
an important issue for industry activists. 
The main reasons that the chemical industry wanted strong preemptive language in any 
TSCA reform bill are fairly straight forward: uniformity, simplicity, and predictability. A survey 
of chemical manufacturers conducted before FL21 became law presented the following top 
concerns regarding chemical regulations in the United States: 
The top problems included ineffective or duplicative regulations (46.2 percent), 
reporting and paperwork burdens (46.2 percent) and conflicting state regulations 
(38.1 percent). In addition, some manufacturers were hopeful that the proposed 
reforms could meaningfully address misinformation about products (32.0 
percent), consumer confusion about chemicals (30.8 percent) and potential supply 
chain disruptions (17.2 percent).
96
 
These justifications are hardly seem surprising as manufacturers are concerned about running a 
business in a profitable manner, which is made more difficult when each state could potentially 
have separate safety standards and separate filing requirements. 
 Many states and advocacy groups were equally concerned about preemption but for 
different reasons. The bills that were proposed before FL21 were seen as “divesting all authority 
                                                          
93
 Id.  
94
 Id.  
95
 Krystal Gabert, Groups Clamor for ‘Safer’ Chemicals, CHEMINFO, April 11, 2013, 
http://www.chem.info/blog/2013/04/groups-clamor-%E2%80%98safer%E2%80%99-chemicals (quoting the 
American Chemistry Council in stating “The current law needs to be improved to reflect modern scientific 
developments in the assessment and management of chemicals. A modernized TSCA must put the protection of 
human and environmental health and safety first, while also enabling America to retain its place as the world’s 
leading innovator.”). 
96
 National Association of Manufacturers (NAM), Survey Shows Manufacturers’ Commitment to TSCA Reform, 
IMPO, March 10, 2016, https://www.impomag.com/news/2016/03/survey-shows-manufacturers-commitment-tsca-
.reform?__hstc=17104102.197963abe1f120924294a1530410a59d.1493654791648.1493752901913.1493756433621
.3&__hssc=17104102.2.1493756433621&__hsfp=20068296. The survey cited by the article is available at 
http://www.nam.org/outlook/.  
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away from states and localities and placing this authority solely with the . . . EPA.”97 States and 
consumer protection groups initially viewed reform efforts as an attempt to strip away regulatory 
authority in an area where states had been the only active participants for over forty years. Many 
states where concerned about demographic specific risks, such as risks to children, the elderly, 
EMS professions, and more.
98
 In fact, the attorney generals of twelve states urged Congress to 
remove any expansion of preemption from FL21.
99
 Moreover, a coalition of “thirty-four law 
professors, legal scholars, and public interest lawyers” argued that an earlier bill aimed at TSCA 
reform did not alter the cost-benefit approach required under Corrosion Proof.
100
 Both the state 
attorney generals and NCSL expressed concern that previous bills did not do enough to protect 
high-risk or susceptible populations.
101
 
After FL21 passed, the California EPA restated its concern about how preemption would 
be implemented and was quoted as believing “state authorities are excessively and unnecessarily 
preempted in exchange for the promise of federal protection that is too meagre.”102 Moreover, 
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 See supra notes 82& 83and the letters cited therein. 
98
 See Hasting, supra note 43, at 322-25; Strengthening Public Health Protections by addressing Toxic Chemical 
Threats: hearing on S. 1009 Before the S. Comm. On Envt’l & Pub. Works, 113th Cong. (2013) (statement of 
Kenneth A cook, President of the Environmental Working Group). 
99
  Kamala D. Harris et al, Joint Letter to Comm. On Envt’l and Pub. Works, January 19, 2016 
[https://perma.cc/YE9F-4CKK] (letter from California, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New 
Hampshire, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont and Washington). The letter laid out seven core principles 
that states wanted to see in the reformed law: (1) States should not be preempted until EPA has taken a final action; 
(2) Once EPA has taken a final action, the scope of state law preempted should be no broader than the scope of 
EPA’s action; (3) States should not be preempted from continuing to establish requirements on chemicals pursuant 
to longstanding state laws; (4) States should not be preempted from continuing to enforce existing requirements on 
chemicals; (5) State laws related to water quality, air quality or waste treatment or disposal should not be preempted; 
(6) States should be able to obtain a waiver to adopt requirements that are more protective than EPA’s if the 
requirements do not unduly burden interstate commerce and do not make it impossible to comply with both state and 
federal law; and (7) States should be able to keep “cops on the beat” to co-enforce requirements that have been 
adopted by EPA. Id. 
100
 Hastings, supra note 44, at 324. The letter cited by Mr. Hastings is available at 
http://static.ewg.org/pdf/Combined-CSIA-Letters-2013.pdf and has been archived at https://perma.cc/D5AK-U9QF. 
These concerns were addressed by FL21 and the removal of the “least burdensome” language from § 6 of TSCA. 
101
 Id.; Harris, supra note 99. 
102
 Kelly Franklin, Reformed TSCA Will Not Constrain Many State-Level Actions, CHEMICAL WATCH, June 28, 
2016, https://chemicalwatch.com/48287/reformed-tsca-will-not-constrain-many-state-level-actions. 
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there was concern that while all states would benefit from strong federal regulations, the 
“legislation does not provide federal EPA with sufficient funds to fully utilize [sic] its new 
authorities.”103 
In the end, FL21 did pass and did manage to garner sixty cosponsors in the Senate, near 
unanimous supporting votes in both houses,
 104
 and the backing of dominant industry groups like 
the ACC, as well as environmental organizations like the EDF.
 105
 The grandfathering of 
California’s and Massachusetts’s chemical programs were essential to getting their respective 
representatives in Congress to support the legislation.
106
 The inclusion of preemption waiver 
language was an additional means of reconciling conflicting bills and placating the concerns of 
some states,
107
 but not all are happy with the final result.
108
  
Some groups like NCSL and ECOS continued to believe that states were being stripped 
of too much authority.
109
 But even the most resistant groups, like SCHF, have conceded that 
while not ideal, FL21 does preserve state authority to regulate chemicals pursuant to other 
federal laws and allow for the possibility of waivers.
110
 The next part of this Article will focus on 
how preemption functions under the new, and hopefully improved, TSCA. 
                                                          
103
 Id.  
104
 Congressional Action Overview for H.R. 2576, the Frank Lautenberg Chemical Safety for the 21st Century Act, 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/2576/all-info; June 23, 2015, House Roll Call, 
http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2015/roll378.xml. 
105
 Passing a Strong New Chemical Safety Law, ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND (EDF), 
https://www.edf.org/health/policy/chemicals-policy-reform (last visited May 6, 2017). 
106
 Cf. Adragna, supra note 85. 
107
 Juan Carlos Rodriguez, Quiet Compromises Set Stage For TSCA Reform Bill's Debut, LAW360, April 25, 2016, 
https://www.law360.com/articles/788354/quiet-compromises-set-stage-for-tsca-reform-bill-s-
debut?article_related_content=1. 
108
 Rizzuto, supra note 79. Another last minute concession that helped the bill pass was language allowing the 
prioritization of known carcinogens. Adragna, supra note 85.  
109
 Joint NCSL & ECOS, supra note 83, at 1-2. 
110
 An Abbreviated Guide to the Frank R. Lautenberg Chemical Safety for the 21st Century Act, SAFER CHEMICALS, 
HEALTHY FAMILIES, http://saferchemicals.org/get-the-facts/an-abbreviated-guide-to-the-frank-r-lautenberg-act-
chemical-safety-in-the-21st-century-act/ (last visited May 6, 2017). 
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III. THE BREADTH OF PREEMPTION, MANUFACTURE INFLUENCE, AND THE EPA’S PROPOSED RULE 
This Part outlines the changes to TSCA and the proposed rule that dictate how risk 
evaluations and preemption will function. Section 18 preemption, which was rewritten and 
expanded, largely because strong preemption was necessary to create a uniform system will be 
presented next. Section 6 will be discussed as necessary to explore how the evaluation process 
shapes preemption and impacts state regulatory autonomy.
111
 Additionally, the EPA’s proposed 
procedural rules for risk evaluations and concerns raised by public comments will be discussed 
as well. 
A. Expanding § 18 Preemption of State Law 
Preemption come in two forms under the FL21 amendments—Post-Review Preemption 
and Pause Preemption.
112
 Because the latter is defined by reference to the former, it is discussed 
second. Post-Review Preemption is further divided between informational requirements and 
substantive restrictions.  
Post-Review Preemption targets both informational and substantive state laws. The 
informational aspects of preemption prevent states from requiring testing and new safety data 
production beyond what the EPA requires for a § 5 or § 6 risk assessment.
113
 This is a more 
expansive prohibition than in the pre-amendment TSCA,
114
 but it still allows states to require the 
development of additional information that is not encompassed by the federal law.
115
 These 
                                                          
111
 Agency actions on new chemicals only become preemptive if addressed under the risk assessment criteria of § 6, 
therefore, this Part does not discuss § 5 independently. Accord Denison Primer, supra note 10, p 8; TSCA § 18(c).  
States will also have ample opportunity to participate in the regulatory process for all new substances regulated 
under TSCA, and if the EPA fails to conduct a review, the state remain free to regulate or file a lawsuit to compel 
action. 
112
 Denison Primer, supra note 10, at 8; 15 U.S.C.A. § 2617(a) (2017). 
113
 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 2617(a), (c)(1), (c)(3)-(4) (2017). 
114
 See Pub. Law 94-469, 90 Stat 2003, 2038-39 § 18(a)(2)(A) (Oct. 11, 1976) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §2617 (2012)).  
115
 Denison Primer, supra note 10, at 8; 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 2617(a), (c) (2017). 
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restrictions are also unlikely to affect various state level “right to know” laws, which require 
public disclosure hazard information or labeling of products containing specific substances.
116
 
The next variety of preemption concerns substantive restrictions on chemical substances, 
categories of chemical substances, or specific uses of chemical substances.
117
 The old law only 
prohibited states and their subdivisions from enacting or enforcing laws that targeted risks and 
uses encompassed in the federal regulation and was not triggered by a finding of no risk.
118
 The 
FL21 amendments are in some ways more expansive. First, the amended law prohibits the 
enforcement or enactment of civil and criminal penalties, while the old law only concerned 
administrative and civil laws.
119
 Second, and more importantly, preemption now extends to the 
creation or enforcement of any law that “restrict[s] the manufacture, processing, or distribution 
in commerce or use of a chemical substance” that has been found “not to present an 
unreasonable risk to health or the environment”120 under § 6(i)(1) or for which a final rule is 
promulgated under § 6(a),
121
 so long as those determinations are consistent with the “scope of the 
risk evaluation under section (6)(b)(4)(D).”122 It should be noted, however, that unlike the old 
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 Accord Denison Primer, supra note 10, at 8; 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 2617(a), (c) (2017). 
117
 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 2617(b), (c)(2) (2017). 
118
 See Pub. Law 94-469, 90 Stat 2003, 2038-39 (Oct. 11, 1976) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §2617 (2012)); see also 
discussion infra Subsection I.A.2. 
119
 Compare 15 U.S.C.A. § 2617(b) (2017), with Pub. Law 94-469, 90 Stat 2003, 2038-39 (Oct. 11, 1976) (codified 
at 15 U.S.C. §2617 (2012)). See also Denison Primer, supra note 10, at 8 
120
 15 U.S.C.A. § 2605(i)(1) (2017). 
121
 15 U.S.C.A. § 2605(a) (2017). 
122
 15 U.S.C.A. § 2617(a)(1)(B) (2017). As amended, the statute provides, no State or political subdivision of a State 
may establish or continue to enforce any of the following: 
(B) Chemical substances found not to present an unreasonable risk or restricted[:] statute, criminal 
penalty, or administrative action to prohibit or otherwise restrict the manufacture, processing, or 
distribution in commerce or use of a chemical substance— 
(i) for which the determination described in section 2605(i)(1) of this title is made, 
consistent with the scope of the risk evaluation under section 2605(b)(4)(D) of this title; 
or 
(ii) for which a final rule is promulgated under section 2605(a) of this title, after the 
effective date of the rule issued under section 2605(a) of this title for the chemical 
substance, consistent with the scope of the risk evaluation under section 2605(b)(4)(D)of 
this title.  
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law, this substantive aspect of Post-Review Preemption does not apply to EPA actions on new 
chemicals in the pre-market review process, unless the EPA also invokes its § 6 risk evaluation 
authority.
123
Additional subsections further illustrate the potential scope of preemption.  
Preemption applies to “the hazards, exposures, risks, and uses or conditions of use of 
such chemical substances included in any final action the [EPA] takes pursuant to § 6(a) (final 
rule) or § 6(i)(1) (no-risk).”124 “Conditions of use” is further defined as “the circumstances . . . 
under which a chemical substance is intended, known, or reasonably foreseen to be 
manufactured, processed, distributed in commerce, used, or disposed of.”125 As will be addressed 
below, the EPA interpreted this definition to encompassing all foreseeable uses of a chemical or 
class of chemicals under review.
126
 Accordingly, upon the publication of a final risk evaluation, 
preemption applies to all conditions of use within the scope of the risk evaluation even if the 
evaluation was triggered by a manufacturer request.
127
  
Preemption also applies to conditions of use that the EPA decides not to restrict.
128
 The 
FL21 legislative history makes clear that Congress intended of preemption to apply to all 
conditions of use within the scope of the risk evaluation, even not regulated.
129
 This is because a 
§ 6 determination that a chemical “does not present an unreasonable risk under conditions of use, 
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 Accord Denison Primer, supra note 10, at 8; 15 U.S.C.A § 2617(c) (2017). 
124
 15 U.S.C.A. § 2617(c)(3) (2017) (emphasis added). 
125
 15 U.S.C.A § 2602(4). 
126
 Infra Section II.D. 
127
 Infra Section II.D. 
128
 Accord Denison Primer, supra note 10, at 8; 162 Cong Rec S3513, 3521 (daily ed. June 7, 2016) (statement of 
Sen. Inhofe). 
129
 162 Cong Rec S3519-20 (daily ed. June 7, 2016) (Dialogue between Sen. Inhofe and Sen. Vitter) Senator Inhofe 
asked Sen. Vitter, “That response raised an interesting follow up question I would like to ask. If EPA’s final Section 
6(a) risk management rule includes a restriction or prohibition on some of the conditions of use identified in EPA’s 
scope of the risk evaluation, but not all of them, is it final agency action as to those other conditions of use?” Id. 
Senator Vitter responded: “That is a very important question and the clear intent of Congress is the answer is yes. 
This is because, to be legally sufficient according to EPA’s own technical assistance, EPA’s Section 6(a) rule must 
ensure that the chemical substance or mixture no longer presents an unreasonable risk.” Id. at S3520. 
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is a . . . final agency action,” which is applicable to all conditions of use identified in the 
scope.
130
 
Before moving on, however, it should be noted that the amended statute provides only 
limited guidance about defining the scope of a risk evaluation.
131
 The EPA is required to publish 
the scope within six months of initiating the evaluation.
132
 The evaluation itself is designed to 
“determine whether a chemical substance presents an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the 
environment, without consideration of costs or other nonrisk factors,” and it must specifically 
address potentially susceptible or exposed populations.
133
  The published scope must include 
“the hazards, exposures, conditions of use, and the potentially exposed or susceptible 
subpopulations the Administrator expects to consider.”134 The Environmental Defense Fund 
(EDF) has framed preemption as applying only to “direct state restrictions on chemical 
production or use,”135 and as permitting states to address “any uses or risks the EPA has not 
addressed.”136 As will be discussed infra the EPA’s proposed procedural rule for risk evaluations 
sheds additional light of the question of scope.
137
 The proposed rule shows that the EDF’s 
framing of preemption may be a little optimistic.
138
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 Id. at S3520 (Statement of Sen. Vitter). 
131
 See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 2605(b)(4)(D), (G) (2017). 
132
 Id. 
133
 15 U.S.C.A § 2605(b)(4)(A) (2017). 
134
 15 U.S.C.A § 2605(b)(4)(D) (2017) (emphasis added). 
135
 Denison Primer, supra note 10, at 8. 
136
 Rizzuto, supra note 79. When questioned by Mr. Rizzuto, Richard Denison of the Environmental Defends Fund 
stated: “The final bill allows states to restrict a chemical until or unless EPA takes up that same chemical and 
addresses the same uses and concerns, he said. The scope of any preemption is directly tied to the scope of EPA’s 
review, leaving states free to address any uses or risks EPA has not addressed . . . .” Id. 
137
 Infra, Part III.D. 
138
 Id. 
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The final form of preemption is “Pause Preemption,” meaning that it only as long as the 
risk evaluation is underway.
139
 This form of preemption is something completely new and has no 
parallel in the pre-amendment TSCA.
140
 Pause Preemption is triggered when the EPA defines 
and publishes the scope of a risk evaluation for a high-priority
141
 chemical, and it ends on the 
earlier of the date the full risk evaluation is published in the Federal Register or the expiration of 
the § 6(b)(4)(G) deadline.
142
 This form of preemption applies to all “hazards, exposures, risks, 
and uses or conditions of use of such chemical substances included in the scope of the” § 6 
evaluation.
143
 Once triggered, a state may not establish any new law that restricts the 
manufacture, processing, or distribution of a substance subject to review.
144
 Pause preemption 
does not, however, apply to the continued enforcement of laws in effect or an action taken before 
the scope is published.
145
 Nor is it triggered by a manufacturer requested evaluation.
146
 
Mandatory waivers further protect state enforcement while federal regulations are being 
promulgated.
147
  
Notably absent from the new statute, is an exemption from preemption if a state 
completely bans the use and distribution of a chemical substance in the state.
148
 However there 
                                                          
139
 15 U.S.C.A. 2617Stanford D. Baird, Edward P. Sangster, Cliff L. Rothenstein, Maureen O'Dea Brill,  The “Most 
Contentious Issue” — Federal Preemption in the Amended Toxic Substances Control Act, K&L GATES (July 28, 
2016), http://www.klgates.com/the-most-contentious-issue--federal-preemption-in-the-amended-toxic-substances-
control-act-07-28-2016/ (under pause preemption “a state is temporarily preempted from imposing any new 
restrictions on a given chemical from the time that EPA defines the scope of a risk evaluation for a high-priority 
chemical until EPA publishes its final risk evaluation or when the deadline for completing the evaluation expires, 
whichever is earlier.”); 15 U.S.C.A. § 2605(E)(vi) (2017). 
140
 15 U.S.C. §§ 2605(a)-(b), 2617(c) (2012). 
141
 As defined by 15 U.S.C.A § 2605(b)(1)(B)(i) (2017).  
142
 15 U.S.C.A. § 2617(b)(1) (2017). 
143
 15 U.S.C.A. § 2617(c)(2) (2017). 
144
 Id. 
145
 15 U.S.C.A. § 2617(b)(2) (2017). 
146
 15 U.S.C.A. § 2605(4)(E)(iv) (2017) (“Chemical substances for which requests have been granted under 
subparagraph (C)(ii) shall not be subject to section 18(b).”). 
147
 See infra Section II.C; 15 U.S.C.A. § 2617(f) (2017). 
148
 Compare 15 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(2)(B) (2012) with 15 U.S.C.A. § 2617 (2017). 
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are several exemptions worth mentioning. First, preemption does not apply to any law or rule 
that was adopted pursuant to another federal law or to satisfy any other federal law.
149
 Thus, 
states remain free to restrict chemical use and production to comply with air and water quality 
standards, such as those under the CAA and CWA.
150
 Preemption also does not preclude states 
from implementing reporting or monitoring requirements that are not otherwise required by the 
EPA under TSCA or any other federal law.
151
 Nor are states prohibited from enacting local or 
regional requirements that are identical to federal law.
152
 As mentioned above, law that were in 
effect on or before August 31, 2003 are exempted from preemption, which preserved 
California’s Prop 65 and Massachusetts’ Toxics Use Reduction Act.153 
 B. Manufacturer Requested Evaluations 
As shown by the discussion thus far, preemption is triggered and defined by the 
published scope of a risk evaluation.
154
 Moreover, manufacturer requested evaluations trigger 
Post-Review Preemption upon promulgation of the final evaluation.
155
 The EPA is also required 
fill 25% to 50% of its evaluation docket with manufacturer requests,
156
  which is unique in the 
                                                          
149
 15 U.S.C.A. § 2617(d)(1)(A)(i) (2017). 
150
 States are permitted to continue enforcing requirements relating to water quality, air quality, and waste treatment 
laws, so long as they do not (1) impose burdens on commerce, (2) address the same hazards as an action taken 
pursuant to TSCA, and (3) cause a violation of an action take pursuant to §§ 5 or 6 of TSCA. 15 U.S.C.A. § 
2617(d)(1)(A)(iii) (2017). 
151
 15 U.S.C.A. § 2617(d)(1)(A)(ii) (2017); see also Denison Primer, supra note 10. 
152
 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 2617(d)(1)(A)(iv), (d)(1)(B). 
153
 Accord 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 2617(a), (b), (d)(2) (2017). See also supra notes 71& 75 (providing citation to Prop 65 
and the Mass. Chem. Safety law). Presently, the dominant view is that even future legal actions taken pursuant to 
these laws will be immune from preemption.  
154
15 U.S.C.A. § 2605(b)(4)(D) (2017). 
155
 See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 2605(b)(4)(C), (b)(4)(E) (2017). 
156
 15 U.S.C.A. § 2605(b)(4)(E)(i). Substances or classes of substances listed on the 2014 update of the TSCA Work 
Plan for Chemical Assessments are not subject to the 50% cap. 130 Stat. at 464 § 6 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C § 
2605(b)(4)(E)(iv)). Moreover, the statute makes clear that publication of risk evaluations is a mandatory 
requirement: 
(C) REQUIREMENT. —The [EPA] shall conduct and publish risk evaluations, in 
accordance with the rule promulgated under subparagraph (B) for a chemical substance—  
(i) that has been identified under paragraph (2)(A) or designated under paragraph 
(1)(B)(i), and  
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realm of health and safety laws.
157
 The EPA is required to give preference to requests concerning 
substances that are currently subject to state restrictions that have “the potential to [for] 
significant impact on interstate commerce or health or the environment.”158 The requesting 
manufacturer is also permitted to submit a proposed risk evaluation with its request, which the 
EPA may utilize in promulgating its evaluation.
159
 While there is certainly a risk of over reliance 
on or blind deference to such data, there are also practical advantages. The proposed evaluations 
provides a mechanism by which companies can share risk data that has been compiled for 
compliance with other regulatory schemes such as the E.U.’s REACH program.160 This could 
help the EPA efficiently identify what uses and exposure scenarios warrant the most thorough 
review.  
At first glance, this appears to give industry massive influence over the regulatory 
agenda. This power is tempered by statutory limitations and the fact that the final regulation 
could heavily restrictive, or even ban, a substance. First, manufacturer requests do not trigger 
pause preemption does not apply.
161
 Second, the EPA is prohibited from expediting or otherwise 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
(ii) subject to subparagraph (E), that a manufacturer of the chemical substance has 
requested, in a form and manner and using the criteria prescribed by the [EPA] in the rule 
promulgated under subparagraph (B), be subjected to a risk evaluation. 
15 U.S.C.A § 2605(b)(4)(C). For a discussion of the proposed procedural rule see infra, Section II.D.  
157
 The nearest analogy to the manufacture requested risk evaluations that this Author could locate is an application 
for substance registration under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. §§136a-
136y (2012), which makes it illegal to sell or market an unregistered substance that is subject to FIFRA. However, 
the FIFRA registration process is more closely analogous to the new substance review process contained in § 5 of 
TSCA, 15 U.S.C.A § 2604 et seq (2017), because it is a mandatory review process prior to a product or new use 
reaching the market, which places the informational burden on the applicant and requires a full risk assessment. See, 
e.g., Donald B. Myers Jr. & Paul A. Lock, Modernizing U.S. Chemicals Laws: How the Application of Twenty-First 
Century Toxicology Can Help Drive Legal Reform, 20 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 35, 68-81 (2012) (discussing FIFRA as 
its provision relate to pesticide residue and providing a general summary of its history and provision); see also 
About Pesticide Registration, EPA, available at https://www.epa.gov/pesticide-registration/about-pesticide-
registration (last visited May 6, 2017) (describing the pesticide registration process under FIFRA). 
158
 15 U.S.C.A. § 2605(b)(4)(E)(iii) (2017). 
159
 15 U.S.C.A § 2625(l)(5) (2017). 
160
 See e.g., Sachs, supra note 12 (comparing of U.S. Chemical regulations with the E.U. REACH Initiative). 
161
 15 U.S.C.A. § 2605(b)(4)(E)(iv) (2017). 
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giving special treatment to manufacturer requested risk evaluations,
162
 unless the substance is 
already subject to state regulation that impacts interstate commerce, as noted above.
163
 
Moreover, manufacturers must pay 100% of the costs of most requested evaluations.
164
 
Specifically, fees will be established at a level sufficient to defray the entire cost of manufacturer 
requested risk evaluations, unless the substance was part of the 2014 Work Plan.
165
 If the 
substance is on the 2014 Work Plan, then fees will be set to defray 50% of the costs.
166
 While the 
general fees has yet to be set, the statute limits the use of manufacturer requested risk evaluation 
fees to defraying the cost of the same.
167
 Thus, it seems likely that the degree to which requests 
will be utilized hinges depend on the price tag.
168
  
 C. Preemption Waivers  
In response concerns raised by states and NGO groups about the expansion of 
preemption, the FL21 amendments also revised the § 18 waiver provisions and preserved 
common law causes of action.
169
 There are two forms of waiver.
170
 The first is non-discretionary 
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 15 U.S.C § 2605(b)(4)(E)(ii) (2017). 
163
 15 U.S.C § 2605(b)(4)(E)(iii) (2017) 
164
 15 U.S.C § 2605 (2017).  
165
 15 U.S.C § 2625(b)(4)(D) (2017). 
166
 Id. 
167
 Id. The public comment period regarding the promulgation of a rule on “Fees for the Administration of the Toxic 
Substances Control Act” closed on August 24, 2017; however, as of this writing, no proposed rule or fee structure 
has been published, despite its scheduled December 2016 deadline. The final rule is scheduled for publication in 
June 2017. See https://www.regulations.gov/docket?D=EPA-HQ-OPPT-2016-0401. The statute allows for the lesser 
25% of the costs of administering §§ 4, 5, and 6 or up to $25 million to be defrayed by user fees collected from 
manufacturers. 15 U.S.C.A. § 2625(b)(4)(B). See also EPA, Consultation to Obtain Input on the New TSCA 
Provision to Collect Fees (August 11, 2016), available at https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016- 
08/documents/fees_consultation_meeting_rev9.pdf. 
168
 Individuals from the chemical industry that spoke with this Author suggested that companies will likely be 
hesitant to submit requests until after observing the EPA conduct several risk evaluations on its own initiative. 
169
 162 Cong Rec S3511 (daily ed. June 7, 2016) (Statements of Sen. Boxer) (“[E[ven after EPA announces its 
regulation, the States have the ability to get a waiver so they can still regulate the chemical, and we have made 
improvements to that waiver to make it easier for States to act.”). See also Id. at S3521 (Statement of Sen Inhofe) 
(“These waiver and scope limitations ensure that the piause [sic] has its intended effect—to ensure that there is one, 
comprehensive, nationally-led risk evaluation occurring at a time, allowing EPA and affected manufacturers to focus 
on and complete the work on a timely basis, and to ensure a uniform and consistent federal approach to risk 
evaluation and risk management.”). Congress stressed the need to balance public health with the protection of 
interstate commerce. Id. at S3521. 
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and exempts a state from Pause Preemption while an agency is conducting a risk evaluation.
171
 
The second is purely discretionary, but if granted, a waiver exempts a state from Post-Review 
Preemption for particular substances that are the subject to risk management under § 6.
172
 
Importantly, and unlike the old law, which provided not legal recourse, if the agency denies a 
waiver request, the state may appeal the decision in court.
173
 The statute also imposes a strict, 
judicially enforceable time limitation on the Agency’s decision of whether to grant a waiver 
request.
174
 However, it is too early to know how liberal the EPA will be in granting waivers. 
D. The EPA’s Proposed Rule for Chemical Risk Evaluations Under TSCA and Concerns 
Raised by Stakeholders 
 The EPA published the proposed Procedures for Chemical Risk Evaluation Under the 
Amended Toxic Substances Control Act on January 19, 2017,
175
 which provides insight into the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
170
 15 U.S.C.A. § 2617(f)(9)(B) (2017).  
171
 15 U.S.C.A. § 2617(f)(2) (2017). These must be granted if compliance with the local regulation (1) will not 
unduly burden interstate commerce, (2) will not cause a violation of federal law; and (3) the state can show “a 
concern about the chemical substance or use . . . based on peer reviewed science.” Id. Alternatively, there is 18 
month window between the initiation of a risk assessment and its completion (possibly three years later) in which a 
state can still enact and enforce regulations and receive a waiver. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 2617(f)(2)(B), 2617(f)(7) (2017).  
172
 15 U.S.C.A. § 2617(f)(1) (2017). However, for the EPA to even consider granting a discretionary waiver the state 
must meet the following four statutory requirements: 
(A) compelling conditions warrant granting the waiver to protect health or the environment; 
(B) compliance with the proposed requirement of the State or political subdivision of the State 
would not unduly burden interstate commerce in the manufacture, processing, distribution in 
commerce, or use of a chemical substance;  
(C) compliance with the proposed requirement of the State or political subdivision of the State 
would not cause a violation of any applicable Federal law, rule, or order; and 
(D) in the judgment of the Administrator, the proposed requirement of the State or political 
subdivision of the State is designed to address a risk of a chemical substance, under the conditions 
of use, that was identified— 
(i) consistent with the best available science; 
(ii) using supporting studies conducted in accordance with sound and objective scientific 
practices; and 
(iii) based on the weight of the scientific evidence. 
15 U.S.C.A. § 2617(f)(1)(A)-(D) (2017) (emphasis added). 
173
 15 U.S.C.A. § 2617(f)(5), (f)(8) (2017). 
174
 15 U.S.C.A. § 2617(f)(3)-(4) (2017) 
175
 EPA, Procedures for Chemical Risk Evaluation Under the Amended Toxic Substances Control Act (hereinafter 
“Proposed Risk Eval. Rule”), 82 Fed. Reg. 7562 (proposed Jan. 19, 2017) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 702). 
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EPA’s present interpretation of the TSCA amendments.176 Of particular interest regarding this 
discussion are the procedures for manufacturer requested evaluations, § 6(b)(4)(C), and the scope 
of risk evaluations, § 6(b)(4)(D). Additionally, a number of industry parties submitted comments 
taking issue with what they believe is an overly broad scoping of risk evaluations and 
excessively burdensome procedures for manufacturer requested evaluations.
177
 
The first step in any risk evaluation is to define the scope, which in turn will later define 
the breadth of preemption.
178
 In this published scope, the EPA proposes to include 
methodological information, which will put the public on notice as to how and with what 
techniques the EPA intendeds use.
179
 More importantly, the agency intends to publish a “draft 
scope” in the Federal Register prior to the final scope.180 The EPA expects that comments on the 
draft scope will “reduce the likelihood of significant comments” when the final scope is 
published.
181
  This is significant for at least two reasons. First, the draft publication will allow for 
states, citizens, companies, and NGOs to argue, and submit data to show, that the proposed scope 
is too broad or too narrow prior to Pause-Preemption being triggered. Second, because “all 
comments that could be raised on information and approaches presented in the scope must be 
presented during this comment period,” as the EPA intends to foreclose any future challenges 
                                                          
176
 The public comment period closed on March 20, 2017, and the final rule is scheduled to be published in June 
2017. 
177
 See, e.g., American Chemistry Council (ACC), Comment Letter on Proposed Risk Eval. Rule (March 20, 2017), 
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=EPA-HQ-OPPT-2016-0654-0005; American Petroleum Institute (API), 
Comment Letter on Proposed Risk Eval. Rule (March 20, 2017), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=EPA-
HQ-OPPT-2016-0654-0055; Biobased and Renewable Products Advocacy Group (BRAG), Comment Letter on 
Proposed Risk Eval. Rule (March 20, 2017), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=EPA-HQ-OPPT-2016-
0654-0015; Dow Chemical Company (DOW), Comment Letter on Proposed Risk Eval. Rule (March 20, 2017), 
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=EPA-HQ-OPPT-2016-0654-0019.  
178
 Proposed Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. at 7570. 
179
 Id. 
180
 Id. 
181
 Id. 
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and objections in future administrative or judicial proceedings concerning comments that could 
have been, but were not, raised during this initial period.
182
  
All evaluations must consider the “uses and conditions of use” of the substance under 
review. However, as agency interprets the term “conditions of use,” it leaves little discretion in 
deciding the breadth of uses and exposure scenarios that will be evaluated.
183
 Specifically, the 
EPA interprets a § 6 evaluation to “encompass all manufacture, processing, distribution in 
commerce, use, and disposal activities that constitute the conditions of use within the meaning of 
section 3.”184 The statute defines “conditions of use” as “the circumstances, as determined by the 
EPA, under which a chemical substance is intended, known, reasonably foreseen to be 
manufactured, processed, distributed in commerce, used, or disposed of.”185 According an 
evaluation must consider “all known, intended, and reasonably foreseen activities” or uses 
associated with the chemical substance.
186
 While recognizing that a narrower reading may be 
possible, the EPA argued that the broader reading best effectuates the intent of Congress.
187
 The 
foundation of this belief is that § 6 evaluation should look at a chemical substance as a whole, 
not a subset of specific uses.
188
 Thus, to consider whether a substance presents an unreasonable 
                                                          
182
 Id. The Agency finds its authority for such action in a well-defined body of administrative law, which is 
described in detail in Nuclear Energy Institute v. EPA, 373 F.3d 1251, 1290-91 (D.C. Cir. 2004). Id. See also 
Nuclear Energy Institute v. EPA, 373 F.3d 1251, 1290-91 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“Absent special circumstances, a party 
must initially present its comments to the agency during the rulemaking in order for the court to consider the issue. 
As a general rule, claims not presented to the agency may not be made for the first time to a reviewing court. To 
preserve a legal or factual argument, we require its proponent to have given the agency a ‘fair opportunity’ to 
entertain it in the administrative forum before raising it in the judicial one.” (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted)). 
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 82 Fed. Reg. at 7570-71. 
184
 Id. 
185
 15 U.S.C.A § 2602(4) (2017). 
186
 82 Fed. Reg. at 7565; at 7568 (emphasis added). 
187
 Id. “EPA acknowledges that different readings of the law may be possible. For example [§] 6(b)(4)(D) requires 
EPA to identify the conditions of use that the Agency expects to consider in a risk evaluation, suggesting that EPA 
does not need to consider all conditions of use.” Id. See also, id. at 7568. 
188
 82 Fed. Reg. at 7565-66. 
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risk of harm under “the conditions of use,” the statute is best effectuated if “the” is interpreted to 
encompass evaluation of all “conditions of use.”189  
 The agency also argued that if the decision of whether a substance, as a whole, presents 
an unreasonable risk is based on a mere subset of specific uses, one or more harmful uses could 
be missed.
190
 Such a piecemeal approach, the EPA believes, would also make meeting the 
judicially enforceable deadlines difficult, if not impossible.
191
 Considering the tens of thousands 
of existing chemicals that must be reprioritized and then potentially evaluated, repeated 
reevaluation for different subsets of uses could be impracticable.
192
  
Turning to manufacturer requests, the EPA was given broad discretion in establishing the 
criteria for an acceptable evaluation, but very little discretion in whether to grant a request if 
those conditions are met.
193
 The agency proposed to give preference to requests where “there 
may be relatively high exposure(s) and/or hazard(s) under one or more conditions of use,”194 and 
the agency intends to tailor each evaluation to best fit the substance and risks under review. 
                                                          
189
 Id. The EPA also noted its ability to complete risk evaluations in phases according to 15 U.S.C.A. § 2605(a), 
which will all the expedition of review for specific uses that are known to pose an unreasonable risk if necessary. Id. 
at 7568. However, such an expedited review would merely be the first phase of a more comprehensive risk 
evaluation. Id. 
190
 Id. at 7565-66.  
191
 Id. 
192
 Id. at 7566.
192
 However, the agency has also stated that it will not initiate a risk evaluation until it is satisfied that 
“sufficient reasonably available information exists to complete the evaluation.” Id. The proposed rule further defines 
“reasonably available” “to mean existing information that EPA possesses, or can reasonably obtain and synthesize 
for use in risk evaluations, considering the deadlines for completing the evaluation.” Id. at 7568. Generally, 
information that has not been, but could be, generated is not reasonably available, “because it will typically not be 
feasible for EPA to require significant chemical testing and receive and assess those test results during the three to 
three and a half year window allotted for risk evaluation.” Id.  
193
  Id. 7563. The EPA is promulgating guidance documents that will inform manufacturers who request a risk 
evaluation how and when to submit draft risk evaluations, as well as the required contents of those drafts, which will 
then be considered by the Agency. Id at pp 7567. Some commentators suggested that the draft evaluations should be 
governed by rules nearly identical to that which the EPA follows, which will ensure that the draft evaluations can 
serve as functional equivalents as EPA created evaluations. See supra, note 177 and the letters cited therein. Some 
others, however, suggested that the EPA should “reserve specific scientific processes regarding hazard and exposure 
information for Agency guidance and discretion, [and] suggest[ed] the rule should address only the process and 
procedure.” Id. 
194
 82 Fed. Reg. at 7563-65. 
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However, under the proposal, the EPA will only consider a manufacturer’s request if it 
“demonstrates . . . that there is sufficient, reasonably available information for the Agency to 
conduct a risk evaluation on the chemical substance under the conditions of use.”195 
Manufacturers must also commit to providing any referenced data, even if not publically 
available and certify as to its accuracy.
196
 If any of the data is not possessed by the requestor, the 
request will be denied.
197
  
To more adequately ensure that the EPA has all relevant information before beginning an 
evaluation, it proposed to publish an announcement of any facially valid risk evaluation request 
in the Federal Register and take public comment.”198 The public is invited to “to identify and/or 
submit any reasonably available information regarding hazard, exposure, potentially exposed 
population(s) and subpopulation(s), and conditions of use that may help inform a risk evaluation, 
including any information gaps in the proposal.”199 The evaluations will otherwise be conducted 
in in the same manner as those initiated by the agency.
200
  
Several companies and trade associations submitted comments, and a reoccurring theme 
in these comments was that the EPA was reading its obligations in setting the scope of risk 
evaluation too broadly. Many manufacturers believe that the EPA’s expansive interpretation of 
“conditions of use” is unnecessary and is likely to impeded timely completion of risk 
evaluations.
201
 The Dow Chemical Company (DOW) specifically recommended a tiered 
prioritization in the pre-risk evaluation process, during which certain uses of a chemical could be 
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 82 Fed. Reg. at 7569. While a manufacturer is not required to submit copies of all relevant data, the EPA 
proposed that at a minimum, a list identifying the relevant data by citation and affirming that the manufacturer 
indeed possesses those data. Id.  
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 See supra, note 177 and the letters cited therein. 
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ruled out as sufficiently mundane to not requiring further evaluation or inclusion within the final 
scope.
202
 Similarly, the  Biobased and Renewable Products Advocacy Group (BRAG) advocated 
for a flexible approach that allowed the EPA to “employ discretion and judgement using a cost 
effective and timely approach to focus its assessment on a specific subset of uses.”203 The 
concern here may be worry about an inefficient use of a limited resource, which ultimately is not 
in anyone’s interest. Alternatively, it could be buyer’s remorse as industry groups are realizing 
just how impactful a thorough EPA evaluation could be on production, distribution, and the 
bottom line.  
Eighteen percent of the total comments addressed the manufacturer requested evaluation 
procedures in some manner.
204
 Two overall themes emerged. On the industry side, commenters 
opposed requiring a requestor have in its possession all relevant information concerning all 
conditions of use for a substance or group of chemicals. Industry also opposed the requirement 
that a manufacturer pay for the evaluation of uses outside its intended use for its product.
205
 
These requirements were viewed as creating an insurmountable burden on industry, which will 
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 DOW comment letter, supra note 177. 
203
 BRAG comment letter, supra note 177. The American Composites Manufacturers Association (ACMA) and 
American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers (AFPM) mirror the sentiment of BRAG in their comments. In 
addition to the areas discussed above, many commenters were concerned with the lack of stakeholder participation 
and transparency during the pre-prioritization process. Many commenters also recommended that the EPA exclude 
non-high-priority uses from the initial scoping phase. See American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers (AFPM), 
Comment Letter on Proposed Risk Eval. Rule (March 20, 2017), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=EPA-
HQ-OPPT-2016-0654-0020; American Composites Manufacturers Association (ACMA), Comment Letter on 
Proposed Risk Eval. Rule (March 16, 2017), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=EPA-HQ-OPPT-2016-
0654-0009; Utility Solid Waste Activities Group (USWAG), Comment Letter on Proposed Risk Eval. Rule (March 
20, 2017), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=EPA-HQ-OPPT-2016-0654-0070.  
204
 The commenters included the following: National Mining Association, Coalition of Companies and Trade 
Associations, American Chemistry Council, Environmental Defense Fund, SI Group, Fertilizer Institute, American 
Petroleum Institute, American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers, AFL-CIO, American Concrete Institute, 
Natural Resource Defense Council, Styrene Information & Research Center, American Coating Association, and 
Safer Chemicals Healthy Families. Public Comments on Procedures for Chemical Risk Evaluation under the Toxic 
Substances Control Act, 
https://www.regulations.gov/docketBrowser?rpp=25&so=DESC&sb=commentDueDate&po=0&dct=PS&D=EPA-
HQ-OPPT-2016-0654 (last visited May 6, 2017). 
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stifle the ability to submit a valid request.
206
 On the other side of the argument, a number of 
public health and environmental groups supported the same requirements. They argued that these 
are essential to protecting public health and preventing abuse of the system.
207
 These groups 
believe it is in the best interest of the public that the agency be precautionary and that industry, 
as the creator of the risk, shoulder the cost of proving safety.  
IV. THE NEW TSCA ADDRESSES MANY STATE AND INDUSTRY CONCERNS, AND WHILE FEDERAL 
ACTIONS WILL BROADLY PREEMPT STATE LAW, THE STATES WILL CONTINUE DOMINATING 
CHEMICAL REGULATION FOR YEARS TO COME 
 Federal actions under TSCA are likely to have broad preemptory effect, thus eventually 
leading to a more uniformity in chemical regulations. However, only those substances designated 
as “high-priority” will be subject to risk evaluation, and only a fraction of that group will be 
evaluated in the near future.
208
 Moreover, states retain the ability to develop “right to know 
laws,” and will have opportunities to influence the rulemaking both officially and unofficially.209 
This Author believes that, on-balance, the new aspects of the law discussed above can and will 
be implemented in a manner that remains conscious of both state and industry interests, thus 
resulting in a better system of regulations overall. 
There are many open questions about the future of TSCA implementation, but the 
expansion of federal preemption should not leave Americans as a whole in a worse position than 
before. The new law addresses many of the concerns that states and NGOs, as well as industry 
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advocates, raised during the years leading to the FL21 amendments in a balances manner.
210
 All 
groups received some of the protections they wanted, but none got everything.
 211
 There will 
undoubtable be future debates where members of the old coalition are in conflict, but this does 
not undermine the integrity of the new law.  
The remainder of this Article expands on the following observations. First, despite the 
preemptive potential of TSCA, states will remain dominant in chemical regulations as a 
whole.
212
 Second, industry parties have an economic motivations to support strong, science-
based regulations.
213
 Lastly, in addition to uncertainties discussed in earlier Parts, commentators 
and practitioners should closely follow the EPA’s funding, manufacturer requested risk 
evaluations, and the utilization of preemption waivers as TSCA reform is implemented and 
enforced.
214
 
A. The FL21 Amendments Addressed Many State Concerns About Preemption and Allow States 
Continued Dominance in Chemical Regulation for the Near Future 
 While it is unlikely that any stakeholder views the new TSCA as perfect, Congress 
included provisions that attempt to address the interests of all sides. The primary concerns that 
states and NGOs raised about preemption included (1) protecting high-exposure or particularly 
susceptible populations, (2) preserve state regulatory autonomy, and (3) maintaining air and 
water quality standards pursuant to state and federal programs.
215
 Some concerns were also 
raised about whether the EPA is provided with enough funding and whether early drafts would 
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actually eliminated the burdens imposed by the Corrosion Proof case.
216
  Industry, on the other 
hand, was and remains concerned with (1) eliminating duplicative or conflicting regulations 
through uniform federal regulations, (2) lessening compliance and reporting paperwork, and (3) 
eliminated perceived misconceptions about certain substances/product.
217
 The amendments gave 
chemical manufacturers more influence in the regulatory process, but states received protections 
as well. 
1. States Retain Substantial Regulatory Power Despite the Expansion of Preemption 
 The FL21 amendments go quite far to protect state interests, despite the fact that § 6 
actions by the EPA will be broadly preemptive with regard to a specific substance. First, the 
TSCA specifically preserves the ability of states to regulate chemicals for the purpose of meeting 
state or federal air and water quality standards.
218
 And, state “right to know” public disclosure 
laws are largely unaffected.
219
 This means there will remain indirect avenues to regulate and 
monitor chemicals even if preemption is triggered. Second, if the EPA pursues § 6 risk 
management, it is statutorily required to consider the impacts of a substance on “potentially 
exposed or susceptible subpopulation[s],”220 which means that federal restrictions can and should 
be tailored specifically protect those most at risk. This allows for special considerations to be 
made with regard to groups like the elderly, children, EMS workers, and company employees. 
Additionally, only high-priority substances, which are those substances the EPA determines 
present the possibility of unreasonable risk, are subject to § 6 evaluations and preemption.
221
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Thus, if the EPA does not identify a substances as high-priority states remain free to regulate that 
substance without fear of preemption. The practical impact of this is that most chemicals will not 
be subject to federal regulation even under the amended law, and the expansion of preemption 
will be slow moving and substance specific. 
Another practical factor weighing in favor of state regulatory power, although likely not 
the only one, that it will likely be many years before the EPA is able complete a substantial 
number of risk evaluations on existing chemicals.
222
 Ninety chemicals have already been 
identified by the EPA as high-priority, but the statute only requires twenty substances to be under 
evaluation by 2022, each review can take 3.5 years once initiated.
223
 Once the evaluations are 
completed, the EPA will still need to draft and promulgate any regulations that it views as 
necessary. The Environmental Working Group (EWG), a staunch opponent of the FL21 
amendments, has been cited stating the EPA will need “28 years to complete risk evaluations on 
the 90 chemicals in its work plan, 30 years to finalize related regulations on those chemicals, and 
35 years to implement the resulting rules.”224 This timeline also assumes that Congress 
adequately funds the EPA, which raises another important concern that states were right to raise: 
Does TSCA provide adequate funding? This is a question that remains unanswered and will be 
expanded on below.
225
  
It is clear that states will still be in the business of regulating chemicals for a long time to 
come and they know it. As the § 6 review process takes some time, and the EPA has a backlog of 
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chemicals to reprioritize,
226
 states will likely find it worthwhile to continue restricting substances 
of concern, even with preemption possible. Moreover, non-discretionary waivers will allow 
states to continue enforcing and developing science-based restrictions while federal rules are 
developed.
227
 Also, states can continue activities in areas where TSCA does not have 
jurisdiction, namely “food contact materials, cosmetics, and increasing disclosure of substances 
in product.”228  
No one really expects the EPA to completely replace states as the only regulator of 
chemicals. Moreover, states can enact and implement regulations more quickly than the EPA as 
they are not constrained by the federal APA and TSCA’s “unreasonable risk” standard.229 States 
seem to be well aware of this fact as the 2016-2017 legislative term has been busy around the 
country. For example, twenty-one states are expected to introduce bills, during the 2017 
legislative cycle, to reduce exposures to chemicals of concern in consumer products, at least 
fifteen are expected to address flame retardants, and fourteen are expected to push for 
identification and disclosure laws.
230
 While one class of flame retardants—the Cyclic Aliphatic 
Bromide Cluster—is included in the EPA’s first ten substances for review, there remain three 
other widely used categories that states are free to regulate.
231
 However, if the EPA evaluates a 
high-priority substance pursuant to § 6 its decisions regarding regulation will set the floor and 
ceiling for the country.  
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2. TSCA Gives the Chemical Industry More Influence in Setting the EPA’s Agenda  
Chemical manufacturers, and downstream entities using hazardous substance in their 
products, benefit from the FL21 amendments principally in two ways, at least as is relevant to 
this paper. First is the ability to request a § 6 risk evaluation for a specific substance. Second, 
once the EPA finishes a § 6 evaluation, preemption is triggered, meaning that industry will 
generally be subject to one set of regulations.  
If utilized, manufacturer requested evaluations give chemical companies an 
unprecedented ability to shape the federal regulatory agenda.
232
 Recall that the statute mandates 
that 25% to 50% of the risk evaluation docket be manufacturer requests.
233
 This allows 
companies to focus the federal government’s regulatory attention, and thus its power of 
preemption, on specific chemicals of the industries’ choosing.234 This power is limited by the 
fact that manufacturers must pay for the costs of such evaluations,
235
 and the procedural burdens 
imposed by the EPA.
236
 
As put forth in the EPA’s proposed rule, only the largest of chemical manufacturers will 
likely have the resources to utilize the request provisions.
237
 This is because of the EPA’s 
interpretation requires it to assess all “conditions of use” for a substance in a risk evaluation,238 
not just those that pose the highest possibility of risk as advocated for by the ACA and DOW.
239
 
As chemical manufacturers have much to gain by federal preemption, there are at least two 
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possible explanations for this position. The first, perhaps the industry’s perspective, is that the 
EPA interpretation is economically and practically wasteful as there is no need to fully assess 
exposure paths that are not likely to pose a risk. The second, a more cynical take, is that the 
industry hopes to influence the “scoping” process to ensure that only those uses that it wants 
reviewed receive federal scrutiny.  
Moreover, both the statute and the proposed rule require the company to pay for the 
entire evaluation, unless the substance was on a preexisting worklist from 2014, in which case 
50% of the costs must still be paid.
240
 The proposed rule creates a very burdensome fiscal and 
informational obstacle for any company wishing to request that a specific substance be 
evaluated.
241
 While the exact costs are not know, it is not unreasonable to assume that risk 
evaluations will cost hundreds of thousands to millions of dollars.
242
 Such a financial obstacle is 
cost prohibitive for smaller companies that likely produce only a handful of substances.  
However, these costs may also give larger companies pause. If there is a fair likelihood that the 
scientific evidence will warrant restrictive regulations, or even a ban, it may not be economically 
wise to take a gamble by requesting an evaluation. In these scenarios it may be more financially 
sound to wait for the EPA to take action on its own, in which case a company can submit the 
data that it already possess, such as that created pursuant to REACH,
243
 or wait for the EPA to 
demand data pursuant to § 4.
244
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For the substances that EPA does evaluate, preemption will give the industry the benefit, 
or burden, of a nationwide regulation. While the EPA could come down heavy handed or even 
ban some uses, there are reasons to believe that federal regulation will often be less burdensome 
than existing state rules. There are at least two reasons to doubt that the current EPA will 
regulate in a manner materially adverse to industry interests, unless urged by the industry itself. 
First, the EPA can only initiate risk evaluations on substances that present an 
“unreasonable risk,” and the evaluation is only meant to address those “unreasonable risks.”245 
This is a high standards that must be support by “substantial evidence” on the record246 and the 
“weight of the science” regarding the substance.247 States are free to regulate so long as they 
rationally believe a public interest would be served by such regulation, but the federal 
government must support its conclusions with better evidence. Moreover, the EPA will probably 
only restrict the most dangerous uses because of the procedural burdens imposed on the risk 
evaluation process.
248
 Thus, whether a substance as a whole may pose an “unreasonable risk” 
under the statute is key, and once that is determined the EPA’s interpretation will dictate what 
uses of that substance do or do not create that risk.  Whatever the result, the EPA’s interpretation 
likely receive substantial deference if challenged in court.
249
 
The second explanation is illustrated by way of example. The EPA recently reversed its 
position with regard to a controversial insecticide, chlorpyrifos, which as of 2015 the agency was 
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poised to ban completely.
250
 The EPA’s own risk evaluation pursuant to the Food Quality 
Protection Act
251
 found numerous scientifically proven links between exposure and a range of 
health problems in children.
252
 The new administration’s EPA now seeks to perform more 
studies, a decision that is being challenged in court.
253
 This suggests that the EPA may be 
hesitant to harshly regulate in a manner that is contrary to commercial interests, even when there 
is a wealth of scientific data supporting such regulations. Despite this, some experts in the area of 
chemical regulation have expressed optimism that the “scientific standards” required under § 26 
of TSCA will prevent political and economic motives from undermining the integrity of the 
law.
254
  
B. Industry Has an Interest in Effective Implementation of TSCA Reform in Light of its 
Economic Investment in Reform and Continued Consumer Advocacy Against Weak Regulations  
 The diverse coalition that supported the amendment of TSCA, may also be key to 
facilitating the implementation of effective and rigorous chemical safety laws. The new TSCA is 
supported by a number of environmental groups, most importantly the EDF, which will likely 
seek legal recourse if the EPA fails to meet its statutory deadlines. But more importantly, the 
chemical industry itself is heavily invested in TSCA reform.
255
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There are several economic reasons that the chemical industry will want to see the new 
TSCA implemented a thoughtful manner. For example, in the four years leading to the passage 
of FL21, the chemical industry spent over $245 million in lobbying efforts relating to TSCA.
256
 
Some of these funds were spent by entities that opposed much of the reform efforts, but others 
like the ACC, which was key to getting reform through Congress, also were large spenders 
behind or against the reform effort.
257
 The ACC has further been quoted stating that “its top 
priority is to reform the TSCA in a way that reflects advances in science, today’s global 
marketplace and improve consumer confidence in the chemicals in their everyday goods.”258 
While the TSCA coalition may disagree about what regulation the science supports, neither the 
public or industry benefit from arbitrary decisions. 
These factors are significant for several reasons. First, the rise of consumer activism 
targeting potential or known toxic substances suggests that the public has lost confidence in 
safety regulators and the industry.
259
 Second, the ACC and other groups spent significant funds 
to shape the final TSCA amendments, and it would be financially foolish to let that money go to 
waste. Third, environmental groups are often viewed as more trustworthy than industry groups in 
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the public eye.
260
 These three factors give industry a unique opportunity when it comes to TSCA 
reform 
The chemical industry can, and should, work with environmental groups and federal 
regulators to ensure that strong science based federal regulations are enacted. This would 
economically benefit the chemical industry because it could help to serve as a rebranding tool in 
an era where these companies are increasingly being cast as not caring about public safety. A 
cooperative campaign of this nature allows the industry to influence public opinion and 
regulation in a manner that it has not previously been able to do. Pointing to the EDF as an ally 
in reform efforts is valuable for an industry that has often been on the opposite side of safety and 
environmental issues. Thus, while there will be disagreement about how rigorous regulations 
should be, this is a unique opportunity for the chemical industry to rebuild public confidence. 
However, if chemical industry does not join the push for strong regulations, there is 
nothing to stop consumer advocacy from continuing as a market-based counterbalance. The 
FL21 amendments do nothing to prevent consumers and NGOs from continuing to pressure 
retailers to remove “unwanted chemicals” from their products. These efforts are largely 
undertaken based on public perception backed by the reports and data presented by NGO 
groups.
261
 Whether these activism efforts actually lead to the utilization of safer alternatives or 
not, which is an open question, they have proven very effective when organized and targeted at 
major retail giants.
262
 Weak federal laws will not inspire public confidence and TSCA can do 
nothing to impact these market based forms of public retaliation. Industry trade groups have 
expressed a desire to see the Trump administration implement TSCA reform in a thoughtful 
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manner,
263
 it would also be in their interests to push for implementation that the public will view 
as protective. Without public confidence, more lenient federal laws will do little to alleviate 
consumer pressures on the market and the commercial benefits of preemption could be lost. 
C. Unknowns and a Look at the Impact of Waivers and Budgets 
TSCA reform is still in its infancy and many thing remain unknown. As already 
discussed, the interaction between states, industry, and NGOs will be important to 
implementation efforts, but other constraints should be followed as this law is put into effect. 
Some of these uncertainties, such as the use of manufacturer requests and changes to the EPA’s 
proposed rule have already been discussed. Two other important unknowns are the impacts of 
state preemption waivers and the EPA’s budget.  
Little can be said about waivers at this time. Both the non-discretionary and discretionary 
waivers must be justified by science-based evidence.
264
 However, to receive a discretionary 
waiver, an applying state must meet a rigorous legal standard.
265
 The statute imposes a 
requirement of seemingly high level of scientific support and health-based justification, while 
still giving the Agency ultimate discretion in whether such evidence warrants a waiver.
266
 If 
dealing with a less regulatory prone EPA, there is a chance that these waiver provisions could 
end up being no more than an empty promise with no real teeth. However, denial or inaction on a 
waiver is legally actionable and must be rational, so this could be a fruitful area of litigation.
267
 
The evaluation of waivers should be closely studied as the first round of risk evaluations are 
published and some states inevitably seek waivers to facilitate for more stringent regulations. 
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Another area of uncertainty that has received the attention of both industry advocates and 
NGOs is that of the EPA’s budget. Congress committed to provide $56 million to the EPA in the 
first year to facilitate the evaluation of the first ten chemicals.
268
 There is, however, nothing 
guaranteeing Congress’ continued financial support, and the EPA has not published its rules 
regarding industry fees, which are supposed to provide $25 million annually.
269
 Once the fees are 
set, it will be some time before the EPA begins seeing that revenue.
270
 
Both the ACC and the EWG have expressed concern that TSCA does not provide the 
EPA with sufficient funding or staff to carry out its new obligations.
271
 Without adequate 
funding the EPA will be hard pressed in its effort to evaluate chemical substances in a timely 
manner or enact science-based, protective chemical regulations. In light of this, the ACC has 
already committed to further lobbying to increase the EPA’s funding with regard to TSCA.272  
However, the White House’s 2018 budget, if adopted, would cut the EPA’s budget by 
between 25% and 32% eliminate up to one-fifth of the staff.
273
 Moreover, as a cost saving 
measure President Trump signed an executive order  that requires federal agencies to repeal two 
regulations for every new regulation promulgated and second calling for zero net spending 
increases by the government.
274
 If these orders can be lawfully executed, they raise serious 
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questions about how the new TSCA program would function.
275
 The temporary funding 
resolution passed by Congress on April 30, 2017 did not slash the EPA’s budget as requested by 
the administration and left TSCA funding “largely intact.”276 But it is safe to say that the EPA’s 
future under this administration is itself full of uncertainties. 
CONCLUSION 
Without a question TSCA reform is a milestone in environmental law and one of the 
most significant developments in the realm of chemical regulations to ever occur in America. 
The law provides the federal government with expanded regulatory authority that will allow for 
the preemption of many existing state programs. Such an expansion of power was important to 
the passage of the law as it was a key factor bringing the chemical industry to the negotiating 
table. However, despite this, the law provides a number of important protections for states as 
well and the EPA is unlikely to replace the states completely. 
The new TSCA may eventually lead to a more uniform system of chemical regulations, 
but this system will only include the most hazardous substances. The creation of federal rules 
will also be relatively slow. This means that despite the expansion of preemption, states are 
likely to continue playing an important role chemical regulation across this country. States will 
continue to be the primary regulatory entity for most chemicals in this country, and retain the 
ability to regulate even those substances subject to TSCA through other federal laws. 
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With luck, the industry, states, and NGOs will work together to ensure that the EPA 
implements TSCA in a manner that achieves the goal of consistent, protective, and science based 
federal regulations. All interested parties have a financial and political stake in ensuring that 
TSCA reform is a success. And, even if the industry pushes for less rigorous regulations in some 
areas, the ability of consumers to directly lobby the market for change remains unaffected.  
There are still many uncertainties in the future of TSCA reform, and this law should be 
closely followed. Ongoing debates about funding TSCA reform are likely to continue. Moreover, 
the reform process is likely to provide a bountiful source of litigation and other policy issues to 
be studied by scholars and practitioners alike. Depending on the course the future takes, Senator 
Lautenberg’s crowning achievement will likely be remembered as smashing success or a 
crushing failure.  
  
